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Flaherty, Jane The Revenue Imperative. Pickering and Chatto, $99.00 ISBN
9781851968989
Examining the Federal Financial Policy
When I teach my Civil War course, I devote a full lecture to the topic of
Union finance. Reflecting conventional wisdom, I tell my students that the
nationalistic ideology of the Republican Party helped shape key financial
measures, including the Morrill Tariff and the national banking system. I also
stress that Union tax policy—which relied heavily on excise taxes on alcohol,
tobacco, and other consumer goods—was highly regressive. Such tax policies, I
inform my class, foreshadowed the Gilded Age, when high tariffs consistently
favored the interests of big business instead of ordinary consumers.
According to Jane’s Flaherty’s provocative The Revenue Imperative, I need
to do some major revisions. She argues that Republicans generally cast aside
ideology and pragmatically experimented with various revenue measures to fund
the war’s staggering costs. The unyielding dictates of total war—and not the
Republican’s pre-war platform—determined fiscal policy. Congress raised
tariffs, for example, to raise revenue rather than to protect domestic
manufacturers. She also argues that wartime taxes may not have been as
regressive as some historians have thought. The two measures that generated the
most revenue for the Union—a general tax on manufactured products and an
income tax—were far more progressive than excise taxes on spirits and tobacco.
While I was not completely persuaded by Flaherty’s arguments, I learned a
great deal from The Revenue Imperative. Flaherty does an excellent job
establishing the antebellum context for Union finance. Key leaders such as
Salmon Chase believed in the U.S. tradition of financing extraordinary war
expenses via debt, while using taxes to fund the ordinary expenses of
government. This system of “Dutch Finance"—so named because it originated
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during the reign of King William III—had been the British model of war finance
since the Glorious Revolution. One key point that Flaherty explains well is how
the mismanagement of the Buchanan administration made Dutch Finance harder
to implement during the war itself. Thanks to the Panic of 1857 and widespread
corruption, the U.S. had run significant deficits during every year of Buchanan’s
term. The Morrill Tariff—signed into law by Buchanan just before Lincoln took
office—was designed to primarily to raise revenue. Tariffs continued to play a
key role in Union finance, Flaherty argues, not because of protectionism
(thought that certainly a secondary motive), but primarily because merchants
paid tariffs duties in specie (gold and silver coins), which the Union desperately
needed to pay the interest on its mushrooming debt.
The importance of tariffs highlights a key challenge for Union fiscal policy:
raising enough ready money to pay interest on the current debt while making
credible promises of repayment on future debt. One of the strength’s of The
Revenue Imperative is that it goes through the range of tax policies that Union
policymakers considered. A general tax on manufactured goods, income taxes,
excise taxes, and taxes on state bank notes (which helped drive many state banks
out of business and contributed to the establishment of a national banking
system) all played a significant role. Flaherty indicates that the most productive
(from the standpoint of generating revenue) was the general tax on manufactured
production. The general tax on manufacturing—which ranged from three to five
percent—worked in conjunction with higher tariffs: whether consumers chose
domestic or foreign goods, they indirectly contributed to the northern war effort.
Taken together, these taxes provided enough revenue to allow the Union to sell a
huge number of bonds, mostly within the Union itself. Periodic cash crunches,
though, sometimes forced the Treasury Department to issue fiat currency in the
form of Greenbacks, which contributed to the significant inflationary pressures
that bedeviled the Union economy during the war.
I found the The Revenue Imperative engaging and interesting—it is clearly
written and informed by a deep reading of the huge literature on Civil War
finance. I remained unconvinced, however, of some of the overarching
arguments. The evidence on the relatively progressive nature of Union taxation
is hardly compelling, especially since the general tax on manufacturing fell
heavily on consumers. The rich could easily afford to pay another five percent on
manufactured goods, while the poor and middle class could not. Nor is it clear
that pragmatism (rather than ideology) shaped Union policy. Taken to its logical
extreme, Flaherty’s argument implies that all political parties would have
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implemented the same financial policies. But would war Democrats have
implemented the same mix of polices (including establishing a national banking
system) as Republican legislators and the Lincoln administration? The answer to
that question is not obvious; perhaps more attention to the arguments of
Democrats and their alternatives would have buttressed Flaherty’s position. In
the end, I may not revise the central themes of my lecture as much as Flaherty
would like, but at the same time it will be richer because of her book.
John Majewski chairs the history department at the University of California,
Santa Barbara. He is the author of Modernizing a Slave Economy: The
Economic Vision of the Confederate Nation (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2009).
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